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Title:	Gadamer’s	“Practice”	of	Theoria	
	
William	Konchak1	
	
Abstract:	
	
This	paper	explores	the	Greek	conception	of	theoria,	Gadamer’s	interpretation	of	it,	and	
how	he	applies	it	to	his	own	hermeneutics.	In	particular,	the	transition	that	Gadamer	
makes	from	traditional	metaphysical	perspectives	of	theoria	in	ancient	thought	towards	
the	activity	of	theoria	within	human	life	is	explored,	and	the	role	that	his	aesthetics	
plays	in	this	process.	The	importance	of	the	intertwining	of	theory	and	practice	for	
Gadamer	is	considered	and	what	the	practice	of	theoria	may	consist	in.	It	is	suggested	
that	Gadamer’s	approach,	which	emphasizes	heightened	experiences	of	interconnection	
to	promote	self-transformation,	is	a	productive	transformation	of	theoria	relevant	to	
contemporary	points	of	view.		
	
	
	
What	is	theoria?	I	will	begin	by	examining	the	Greek	conception	of	theoria	before	
turning	to	Hans-Georg	Gadamer’s	interpretation	of	it	and	what	the	“practice”	of	theoria	
might	look	like	for	him.2	In	my	discussion	of	the	Greek	conception	of	theoria,	I	will	be	
largely	drawing	upon	Andrea	Nightingale’s	general	account	of	theoria	and	specifically	
Plato’s	conception	of	theoria	from	her	book	Spectacles	of	Truth	in	Ancient	Greek	
Philosophy.		
Philosophy	first	emerged	as	a	discipline	in	Greece	in	the	fourth	century	BCE	and	
there	was	a	need	to	define,	legitimize,	and	outline	the	scope	of	this	new	discipline	and	
how	it	differed	from	other	approaches	to	experience	wisdom.3	From	the	debates	among	
Greek	thinkers	at	this	time	about	the	nature	of	philosophy	and	hence	the	highest	type	of	
knowledge,	there	was	“generated	(among	other	things)	a	novel	and	subversive	claim:	
that	the	supreme	form	of	wisdom	is	theoria,	the	rational	‘vision’	of	metaphysical	
truths”.4	Nightingale	explains	that	theoria	was	related	to	the	traditional	practice	of	
making	a	journey	to	spectacles	and	festivals	in	order	to	give	it	legitimacy,	and	
distinguishes	between	two	forms	of	theoria,	the	“civic”	and	the	“private”.	In	respect	to	
the	civic,	she	explains	that	in	many	instances	the	theoros	(the	person	participating	in	the	
theoria)	was	sent	by	their	city	as	an	official	representative	and	would	journey	abroad	to	
a	festival	or	oracular	center.	They	would	view	the	events	there	and	“returned	home	
with	an	official	eyewitness	report”.5	In	regards	to	the	private	theoros,	they	only	needed	
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to	answer	to	themselves;	however,	in	both	cases,	although	the	practice	of	theoria	
covered	the	whole	process	of	journeying,	including	separating	from	home,	spectating,	
and	reentry,	it	was	the	act	of	seeing	or	witnessing,	usually	focused	on	sacred	objects	or	
events,	that	was	central.	Nightingale	explains	that	“this	sacralized	mode	of	spectating	
was	a	central	element	of	traditional	theoria,	and	offered	a	powerful	model	for	the	
philosophic	notion	of	‘seeing’	divine	truths”.6		
Plato	drew	upon	traditional	conceptions	of	theoria	with	its	model	of	journeying,	
spectating	and	returning.7	For	Plato,	theoria	involves	a	process	of	leaving	behind	or	
becoming	blind	to	the	ordinary	world	for	a	time,	which	isn’t	a	permanent	withdrawal	
from	the	world,	but	a	temporary	vision	through	which	there	can	be	a	re-orientation	of	
oneself.	Nightingale	writes,	“In	the	Republic,	Plato	makes	a	paradoxical	and	
controversial	claim,	namely,	that	turning	away	from	the	world	of	becoming	and	
contemplating	an	unchanging	reality	will	give	us	better	insight	and	virtue	in	the	earthly	
realm”.8	Nightingale	maintains	that	this	contemplation	does	not	impede	the	philosopher	
from	practical	action	upon	their	return.9	This	blindness	to	the	world	is	temporary	and	
there	is	a	re-engagement	with	the	world,	but	the	philosopher	can	take	a	more	impartial	
view	of	the	social	realm	even	as	they	live	within	it.	Nightingale	maintains	that	“the	
practice	of	theoria…produce[s]	a	moral	agent	who	will	be	just	and	impartial	in	his	
dealings	with	the	world,	using	the	apprehension	of	the	Forms	as	a	‘measure’	for	all	his	
actions,”	and	that	such	a	contemplative	journey	is	transformative.10	Now,	this	does	not	
mean	that	there	is	a	perfect	knowing,	and	Nightingale	suggests	that	unlike	an	ideal	
philosopher	who	will	achieve	a	complete	journey	in	one	go,	the	human	philosopher	will	
move	between	the	world	and	the	Forms	throughout	their	life,	achieving	at	most	only	a	
partial	view	of	the	Forms.11	These	profound	insights	will	change	the	philosopher	and	
affect	their	daily	lives,	but	there	will	never	be	a	perfect	seeing.			
Nightingale	states	that	“most	twentieth	century	thinkers,	of	course,	view	Greek	
metaphysical	philosophy	with	suspicion	if	not	scorn.	The	conception	of	knowledge	as	
theoria	is,	for	some,	a	cowardly	flight	from	the	world	of	action	and,	for	others,	a	
pernicious	power-grab	posing	as	disinterested	speculation”.12	Nightingale	points	to	a	
passage	from	Nietzsche	that,	according	to	her,	clearly	reflects	some	of	the	central	claims	
made	by	modern	and	post-modern	criticisms	of	the	spectator	theory	of	knowledge.	She	
explains	that	in	the	passage	he	rejects	conceptions	such	as	a	disembodied	intellect,	non-
perspectival	viewpoints,	objective	truth	beyond	that	constructed	by	the	human	mind,	
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and	“the	belief	in	a	mode	of	cognition	separated	from	will,	desire,	and	the	emotions”.13	
However,	Nightingale	maintains	that	these	criticisms	“hardly	do	justice	to	the	Greek	
theorists”.14	She	explains	that	in	Plato’s	understanding	of	theoria,	eros	and	wonder	play	
important	roles	in	the	experience	of	contemplation	and	that	for	Plato	“theoria	is	fueled	
and	sustained	by	erotic	desire,”	and	points	out	that	the	theoretical	philosopher’s	vision	
of	theoria	is	partial	and	that	the	sight	of	beautiful	human	and	celestial	bodies	plays	a	key	
role	in	the	activity	of	theoria	in	some	of	his	dialogues.15	Nightingale	maintains	that	most	
modern	and	postmodern	criticisms	of	Greek	theoria	center	around	what	is	seen	as	a	
problematic	distance	of	a	spectator	that	allows	“the	subject	to	stand	over	against	the	
object”16	and	understand	it	objectively.	She	explains	that,	according	to	this	line	of	
thought,	a	theoretical	gaze	objectifies	what	it	views	and	encourages	the	domination	and	
control	of	these	objects,	a	viewpoint	which	has	been	extended	to	include	political	and	
technological	control.17	In	Nightingale’s	view,	these	critiques	are	more	relevant	to	
Cartesian	thinking	and	modern	science	than	Greek	theorizing.	According	to	Nightingale,	
far	from	Greek	theorizing	being	an	impartial	apprehension	of	an	object	at	a	distance,	
Greek	theoretical	philosophers	sought	to	distance	themselves	from	the	world	to	
establish	a	kinship	with	metaphysical	objects,	and	in	so	doing	to	transform	
themselves.18	Theoria	thus	understood	can	be	seen	as	a	part	of	a	philosophical	and	
transformative	way	of	life,	and	profound	insights	lead	towards	greater	wisdom	and	
changes	in	the	philosopher.			
Gadamer’s	conception	of	theoria	reflects	the	limitations	and	partial	and	ongoing	
nature	of	the	insight	of	theoria	that	Nightingale	highlights,	and	how	it	differs	from	
scientific	objectivity	and	domination,	albeit	his	explanation	for	this	is	that	he	finds	
Greek	knowledge	to	have	been	“so	much	within	language,”19	a	perspective	that	relates	
in	ways	to	the	crucial	role	that	language	plays	in	his	own	hermeneutics.	For	Gadamer,	
language	is	the	universal	medium	and	it	is	through	language	that	we	experience	the	
world.	Language	on	the	one	hand	limits	us	and	on	the	other	hand	opens	us	up	to	new	
possibilities	of	experience,	and	the	activity	of	theoria	is	also	within	language.	Gadamer’s	
view	of	theoria	has	strong	parallels	to	Nightingale’s	viewpoint	that	theoria	is	a	
transformative	experience	rather	than	being	abstract	and	disinterested,	and	Gadamer	
emphasizes	theoria	as	a	form	of	participation	and	enhanced	presence.			
According	to	Nightingale,	the	activity	of	theoria	involves	a	re-defined	sense	of	
self,	and	in	relation	to	this	she	quotes	Gadamer	in	respect	to	how	theoria	is	an	
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experience	of	the	real,	involves	forgetting	one’s	own	purposes,	being	present,	is	
participatory,	and	that	to	be	a	spectator	is	to	give	oneself	in	self-forgetfulness	to	what	
one	is	viewing.20	By	reference	to	this	idea,	Nightingale	goes	on	to	question	what	kind	of	
self	we	can	associate	with	this	self-forgetting	and	wonders,	given	that	one	is	blind	to	the	
regular	world	when	contemplating	eternal	beings,	how	this	might	relate	to	self-
understanding.	She	writes:	
The	fourth-century	philosophers	went	in	search	of	new	kinds	of	selves.	In	
particular,	they	reexamined	the	boundaries	between	the	human	and	the	divine,	
positing	a	kinship	between	human	nous	and	divine	and	metaphysical	beings.		
Departing	from	traditional	Greek	views,	these	philosophers	introduced	the	
notion	of	a	theorizing	self,	which	they	defined	in	relation	to	metaphysical	and	
divine	beings	and	to	the	rationally	organized	cosmos.	In	placing	the	human	being	
in	this	(new)	relation	to	the	divine,	these	philosophers	developed	a	conception	of	
human	identity	that	was	not	socially	or	environmentally	defined.21	
	
Nightingale	explains	that	Plato	and	Aristotle	were	of	course	fully	aware	that	humans	are	
“composite	creatures”	that	are	embodied	and	live	in	and	are	“defined	in	relation	to	the	
social	and	natural	world,”	but	through	identifying	with	the	rational	faculty	as	the	best	
aspect	of	our	human	self,	“the	ancient	philosophers	invited	people	to	conceive	of	
themselves	(and	the	world)	in	a	whole	new	way”.22	Now,	Gadamer	arguably	is	also,	to	
draw	upon	Nightingale’s	expression,	in	search	of	a	“new	kind	of	self,”	one	that	would	
still	be	socially	defined	and	within	language	but	moving	towards	more	universality	and	
relationality.	One	of	the	reasons	why	Gadamer	draws	upon	the	Greeks	in	his	thought	is	
that	their	perspectives,	reflected	in	conceptions	such	as	theoria,	provide	an	alternative	
possibility	for	experience	beyond	the	subject-object	dualism	present	in	Cartesian	
inspired	thought	and	scientific	method.23	However,	for	Gadamer	this	takes	place	
through	language	rather	than	through	a	Divine	Mind	as	in	ancient	thought.24	However,	
transitions	such	as	these	create	challenges,	and	in	my	view,	one	of	the	hardest	tasks	
facing	the	interpreter	of	Gadamer	is	how	he	draws	upon	metaphysical	theories	yet	
tends	to	back	away	from	their	metaphysical	aspects	and,	related	to	this,	the	way	he	
combines	strong	notions	of	truth	with	human	finitude.	For	example,	Gadamer	writes	
that	“life…is	a	unity	of	theory	and	practice	that	is	the	possibility	and	the	duty	of	
everyone.	Disregarding	oneself,	regarding	what	is:	that	is	the	behavior	of	a	cultivated,	I	
might	almost	say	a	divine,	consciousness,”25	which,	if	one	were	considering	Plato,	such	a	
conception	would	be	backed	by	the	Forms	as	true	Being.	Gadamer	also	associates	the	
experience	of	artworks	and	his	understanding	of	theoria	with	conceptions	of	the	
	 5	
absolute,26	which	seem	to	bring	out	similar	tensions.	However,	Gadamer’s	hermeneutics	
is	an	attempt	to	articulate	the	practice	of	moving	towards	more	theoretic	and	universal	
perspectives	and	applying	this	experience	dynamically	back	into	our	concrete	situation.			
For	Gadamer,	ancient	conceptions	of	theory	are	different	from	how	he	
characterizes	the	modern	theoretical	attitude	of	science	as	one	that	stands	back	and	
observes,	with	theoretical	knowledge	being	understood	in	terms	of	dominating	what	
exists,	and	he	maintains	that:	
“Theory”	in	the	ancient	sense,	however,	is	something	quite	different.	There	it	is	
not	just	that	existing	orders	as	such	are	contemplated,	but	“theory”	means	
sharing	in	the	total	order	itself.27	
	
In	Gadamer’s	view,	theoria	does	not	fall	into	presences	that	would	be	subject	to	
Heidegger’s	critique	of	the	metaphysics	of	presence	and	in	fact	would	seem	to	imply	a	
type	of	letting	be	given	how	he	mentions	that	theoria	maintains	“the	dignity	of	a	
‘thing’”.28	For	Gadamer,	the	experience	of	theoria	seems	to	be	a	type	of	enhanced	
awareness	and	relationality	rather	than	self-conscious	clarity	or	vision	of	structure,	and	
he	emphasizes	the	participatory	aspects	of	theoria.	Gadamer	points	to	the	original	sense	
of	theoria	for	the	Greeks:	
The	word	means	observing	(the	constellations,	for	example),	being	an	onlooker	
(at	a	play,	for	instance),	or	a	delegate	participating	at	a	festival.	It	does	not	mean	
a	mere	“seeing”	that	establishes	what	is	present	or	stores	up	information.	
Contemplatio	does	not	dwell	on	a	particular	entity,	but	in	a	region.	Theoria	is	not	
so	much	the	individual	momentary	act	as	a	way	of	comporting	oneself,	a	position	
and	condition.	It	is	“being	present”	in	the	lovely	double	sense	that	means	that	the	
person	is	not	only	present	but	completely	present.	Participants	in	a	ritual	or	
ceremony	are	present	in	this	way	when	they	are	engrossed	in	their	participation	
as	such,	and	this	always	includes	their	participating	equally	with	others	or	
possible	others.29	
	
From	this	description,	we	can	see	that	Gadamer	is	pointing	to	holistic	
experiences	beyond	particular	entities	to	a	region,	and	an	intensified	way	of	being	
present	and	participation	that	involves	experiences	of	equality.	The	type	of	vision	that	
Gadamer	associates	with	theoria	is	not	that	of	a	neutral	observer,	whose	emphasis	is	on	
the	control	of	an	object	or	to	turn	it	to	their	own	purposes	by	explaining	it,	but	rather	
involves	participation	and	more	relational	experience,	and	Gadamer	relates	theoria	to	a	
type	of	good	that	is	held	in	common	and	accessible	to	all	and	is	not	like	distributed	
goods	that	are	owned	by	some	and	excluded	from	others.30		What	we	have	in	common	
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and	community	are	familiar	themes	that	can	be	found	in	Gadamer’s	conception	of	the	
festival	as	an	experience	that	leads	past	our	normal	purposes	and	identifications	
towards	a	more	holistic	relation	to	one	another.	Gadamer	writes	that	“if	there	is	one	
thing	that	pertains	to	all	festive	experiences,	then	it	is	surely	the	fact	that	they	allow	no	
separation	between	one	person	and	another.	A	festival	is	an	experience	of	community	
and	represents	community	in	its	most	perfect	form.	A	festival	is	meant	for	everyone”.31	
According	to	Gadamer,	in	a	festival,	separations	between	individuals	are	set	aside	in	
favor	of	a	common	respect	and	openness	to	all,	and	instead	of	falling	into	individual	
conversations	and	activities	a	sense	of	unity	prevails.	This	points	towards	collective	
communal	experiences	which	may	lead	to	a	greater	sense	of	unity	than	may	normally	be	
experienced.	For	Gadamer,	theoria	seems	to	be	a	type	of	respectful	participation	that	
avoids	objectification	and	involves	relational	perspectives.	The	activity	of	theoria	is	
linguistically	mediated	and	not	a	“pure	seeing,”	but	nevertheless	this	is	a	profound	
experience	that	may	lead	to	self-transformation	which	may	change	our	relation	to	other	
people	and	the	world	more	generally.			
Gadamer’s	understanding	of	theoria	perhaps	can	be	somewhat	clarified	by	very	
briefly	looking	at	how	Gadamer	interprets	Plato.	Rather	than	focusing	on	a	two-world	
Platonism	of	static	Forms	as	real	Being	in	contrast	to	a	diminished	physical	and	
historical	world,	Gadamer’s	interpretation	of	Plato	points	towards	the	positive	
possibility	of	the	role	for	becoming	in	the	mixture	of	a	good	life	in	Plato’s	Philebus.	He	
explains	that	“only	when	the	mixture	is	no	longer	thought	of	as	a	diminution	and	
clouding	of	the	pure,	true,	and	unmixed,	but	as	a	genus	of	its	own,	can	it	be	the	place	
where	we	see	how	the	being	of	the	good	and	the	true	is	constituted”.32	According	to	
Gadamer,	the	conception	of	noetic	ideas	existing	apart	in	themselves	is	an	abstraction	
from	the	mixture	within	life.33	He	later	explains	that	Plato	names	“beauty,	symmetry	or	
measuredness,	and	truth	(alētheia)…as	the	three	structural	components	of	the	good,	
which	appears	as	the	beautiful,”34	and	writes:	
What	is	viewed	from	the	perspective	of	the	Republic	(or	the	Symposium)	as	the	
pure	unmixed	good	or	beautiful	“beyond	being”	is	here	[in	the	Philebus]	
determined	to	be	the	structure	of	“the	mixed”	itself.	In	each	case	it	would	seem	to	
be	found	only	in	what	is	concretely	good	and	beautiful.	And	precisely	the	unity	
and	integration	of	the	appearance	itself	would	thus	appear	to	constitute	its	being	
good.	This	thesis,	it	seems	to	me,	does	not	represent	a	change	in	Plato’s	teaching,	
a	change	that	would	have	led	him	to	abandon	the	doctrine	of	ideas	or	the	
transcendence	of	the	good.	It	is	still	true	that	the	good	must	be	separated	out	of	
everything	that	appears	good	and	seen	in	distinction	from	it.	But	it	is	in	
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everything	and	is	seen	in	distinction	from	everything	only	because	it	is	in	
everything	and	shines	forth	from	it.35	
	 	
According	to	Gadamer,	the	good	is	something	that	shines	forth	within	our	daily	
lives	through	its	appearance	in	the	beautiful	rather	than	being	an	experience	of	a	second	
world,	but	it	also	transcends	what	it	appears	within.	If	we	consider	what	the	activity	of	
theoria	is	for	Gadamer,	I	would	understand	it	not	as	a	vision	of	metaphysical	objects	in	a	
second	world,	but	rather	as	a	heightened	experience	of	becoming	as	emergent	
possibility	in	the	here	and	now.36	Gadamer	famously	remarks	that	“being	that	can	be	
understood	is	language,”37	and	theoria	is	a	heightened	experience	that	can	transform	our	
understanding	of	being,	our	language,	and	ourselves.	An	intensified	experience	of	
theoria	may	lead	to	new	experiences	of	being	which	may	inform	our	self-understanding,	
a	process	of	transformation.	
Gadamer	points	to	the	importance	that	the	Greek	word	theoria	originally	meant	
to	participate	in	a	festive	act,	not	merely	as	a	spectator,	but	rather	“‘to	be	fully	there,’	
which	is	a	highest	form	of	activity	and	reality,”38	also	relates	activity	and	reality	to	the	
Greek	term	energeia,	and	writes:	
Whoever	participates	in	a	cultic	act	in	this	way	lets	the	“divine”	emerge,	so	that	it	
is	like	a	palpable	bodily	appearance.	This	applies	very	well	to	an	artwork.	
Standing	before	its	appearing	we	also	say:	“That	[sic]	right!”	[So	ist	es!].	What	has	
come	forth	is	something	with	which	we	agree,	not	because	it	is	an	exact	copy	of	
something	but	because	as	an	image	it	has	something	like	a	superior	reality.	It	
may	perhaps	also	be	a	copy	of	something,	but	it	does	not	need	to	have	anything	
about	it	that	is	like	a	copy.	In	thinking	of	it	one	thinks	of	what,	for	example,	the	
mystery	cults	protected	as	a	holy	secret.39		
	
Gadamer	is	indicating	a	relation	to	divine	or	holy	experience	that	has	some	affinity	with	
the	experience	at	religious	festivals	in	Greek	times.	In	his	consideration	of	a	copy,	
Gadamer	is	not	discounting	that	it	could	reflect	an	existent	reality,	but	he	is	emphasizing	
the	possibility	of	creative	emergence.40			
In	Gadamer’s	view,	theoria	is	not	something	abstract,	like	a	scientific	theory	or	
other	such	constructs.	Rather,	theoria	is	an	activity	that	takes	us	outside	of	ourselves	
and	is	beyond	the	conscious	control	of	a	subject.	Gadamer	explains	that	“theoria	is	true	
participation,	not	something	active	but	something	passive	(pathos),	namely	being	
totally	involved	in	and	carried	away	by	what	one	sees,”	and	remarks	that	“considered	as	
a	subjective	accomplishment	in	human	conduct,	being	present	has	the	character	of	
	 8	
being	outside	oneself”.41	As	Gadamer	continues,	he	relates	this	to	the	ecstatic	
experience	of	divine	madness	in	Plato’s	Phaedrus:	
In	the	Phaedrus	Plato	already	described	the	blunder	of	those	who	take	the	
viewpoint	of	rational	reasonableness	and	tend	to	misinterpret	the	ecstatic	
condition	of	being	outside	oneself,	seeing	it	as	a	mere	negation	of	being	
composed	within	oneself	and	hence	as	a	kind	of	madness.	In	fact,	being	outside	
oneself	is	a	positive	possibility	of	being	wholly	with	something	else.	This	kind	of	
being	present	is	a	self-forgetfulness	and	to	be	a	spectator	consists	in	giving	
oneself	in	self-forgetfulness	to	what	one	is	watching.42	
	
Far	from	being	“madness,”	this	experience	may	bring	us	out	of	our	limited	and	normal	
awareness	towards	a	more	relational	experience	of	reality.	Gadamer,	considering	
insights	from	Greek	religion,	Rilke,	and	Hegel	in	relation	to	experiences	beyond	that	of	
the	conscious	individual,	remarks	that	if	Greek	religion	viewed	“human	decision	as	the	
result	of	divine	action	rather	than	simply	as	the	exercise	of	human	choice,	then	it	did	
justice	to	this	truth:	we	are	always	other	and	much	more	than	we	know	ourselves	to	be,	
and	what	exceeds	our	knowledge	is	precisely	our	real	being”.43	From	this	description,	
we	can	see	the	importance	of	Gadamer’s	conception	that	what	is	beyond	our	subjective	
consciousness	is	something	“more	real,”	which	seems	to	point	towards	a	more	holistic	
and	profound	sense	of	self	that	we	are	not	normally	of	aware	of	and	which	works	
towards	overcoming	subject-object	dualism.	Whether	we	are	considering	Gadamer’s	
understanding	of	theoria	or	his	aesthetics	with	its	conceptions	such	as	the	festival,	they	
reflect	the	impetus	towards	encouraging	experiences	of	relationality	that	we	find	within	
Gadamer’s	thought	more	generally.		
According	to	Gadamer,	theoria	and	practice	are	intertwined,	and	aesthetic	
experiences	are	more	real	than	the	everyday	but	are	not	separate	from	it	and	are	rather	
intensifications	of	the	everyday	that	may	transform	us.	In	this	respect,	both	Plato	and	
Aristotle	indicate	theory	is	superior	to	practice,	but	for	Plato	theory	is	related	to	
practice	while	for	Aristotle,	judging	from	renowned	and	controversial	passages	in	the	
Nicomachean	Ethics	Book	X	there	seems	to	be	a	separation	between	theory	and	practice,	
and	theoretical	contemplation	divorced	from	the	everyday	is	the	highest	form	of	
happiness.	However,	given	the	overall	practical	orientation	of	Aristotle,	the	relation	
between	theory	and	practice	in	his	thought	is	a	matter	of	scholarly	contention.44	In	this	
respect,	Gadamer	argues	that	for	Aristotle	there	is	an	intertwining	between	theory	and	
practice.45	Walter	Brogan	maintains	that	Aristotle’s	understanding	of	friendship	
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supports	Gadamer’s	view,	and	that	a	self-sufficient	contemplative	attunement	with	
oneself	allows	oneself	to	be	present	to	the	other	and	respectful	of	their	differences	in	
friendship,	and	true	friendship	is	an	activity	of	theoria	in	practice.46	
Nightingale	notes	that	there	may	be	challenges	assimilating	Plato’s	
understanding	of	theoria	to	modern	thought:	
We	may	object	to	a	philosophical	theory	based	on	a	“metaphysics	of	presence”	
which	does	not	acknowledge	human	subjectivity	(i.e.	that	the	human	subject	
constructs	what	it	perceives,	apprehends,	or	knows).	In	addition,	Plato’s	
divinization	of	the	Forms	and	his	comparison	of	the	activity	of	contemplation	to	
a	religious	revelation	will	strike	many	modern	readers	as	objectionable.		
Nonetheless,	we	must	acknowledge	that,	for	Plato,	the	activity	of	theoria	takes	as	
its	model	a	cultural	practice	that	was	essentially	religious,	i.e.	theoria	at	religious	
sanctuaries	and	festivals.47		
	
Gadamer	was	also	well	aware	of	concerns	such	as	these,	which	perhaps	
contributes	to	why	he	tries	to	avoid	associating	theoria	with	objective	presences,	
articulates	a	more	modest	variation	of	theoria	related	to	human	finitude	through	
language,	and	draws	upon	conceptions	such	as	the	cultic	and	heightened	experience	
more	generally,	but	relates	them	with	less	exotic	cultural	forms.	For	example,	in	his	
essay	“The	Festive	Character	of	the	Theatre,”	Gadamer	defends	cultic	experiences	and	
associates	them	with	experiences	of	the	festive	and	the	theatre	in	modern	times.	He	
writes	that	“all	cultic	ceremony	is	a	kind	of	creation,”	and	notes	that	“the	original	and	
still	vital	essence	of	festive	celebration	is	creation	and	elevation	into	a	transformed	state	
of	being”.48	The	strong	relationality	and	creative	emergence	that	runs	through	
Gadamer’s	aesthetics	finds	cultural	placeholders	in	festivals,	the	theatre,	and	artwork	
more	generally.	Nightingale	explains	that	Plato	drew	upon	the	accepted	cultural	
practice	of	theoria	and	through	this	“claimed	legitimacy	for	theoretical	philosophy	and	
found	a	way	to	structure	philosophic	practice	and	make	it	more	intelligible	to	the	
layperson”.49	I	would	suggest,	similarly,	that	Gadamer	finds	legitimacy	for	heightened	
experiences	of	interconnection	such	as	the	cultic	and	theoria	through	drawing	upon	
more	accepted	notions	such	as	festivals,	the	theatre,	and	aesthetics	more	generally.	
Gadamer	writes,	“I	believe	that	the	arts,	taken	as	a	whole,	quietly	govern	the	
metaphysical	heritage	of	our	Western	tradition,”	and	remarks	later	that	“art	belongs	in	
the	neighborhood	of	theoria”.50	Such	a	transition	or	“translation”	is	not	without	
challenges,	and	although	I	have	pointed	to	tensions	in	Gadamer’s	thought,	these	
frictions	and	ambiguities	in	his	approach	are	arguably	quite	productive,	whereby	
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through	holding	both	to	strong	notions	of	truth	and	human	finitude	his	conception	of	
theoria	both	draws	upon	and	reinvigorates	transcendent	aspects	of	Greek	thought	
through	their	articulation	in	a	contemporary	context.	This	is	perhaps	not	only	a	good	
example	of	Gadamer’s	contention	that	we	participate	in	an	ongoing	and	living	tradition	
that	we	may	draw	upon	for	our	benefit	and	contribute	to	its	ongoing	emergence,	but	
specifically	points	to	the	value	of	our	metaphysical	philosophical	tradition	that	Gadamer	
defends	contra	Heidegger.				
I	would	suggest	that	the	practice	of	theoria	for	Gadamer	would	be	the	attempt	to	
open	towards	more	relational	experiences	and	perspectives.	This	is	not	just	a	theory	of	
relationality,	but	rather	a	practice	of	experiencing	the	transformative	effect	of	
heightened	interconnection.	In	Gadamer’s	aesthetics,	the	experience	of	beauty,	order,	
and	harmony	are	also	important	to	his	thought,	and	what	I	believe	Gadamer	is	driving	at	
is	encouraging	the	emergence	of	perspectives	and	cultural	forms	that	may	support	self-
transformation	and	more	harmonious	experiences	of	community.	Nightingale	explains	
that	for	Plato,	the	experience	of	beauty	and	seeing	the	Forms	leads	towards	becoming	
more	virtuous,	wise,	and	happy.51	For	Plato,	the	contemplation	of	Forms	moves	us	out	
of	illusion	and	can	promote	virtue,	and	Gadamer	seems	to	be	pointing	in	the	same	
general	direction	as	this,	albeit	instead	of	theoria	being	a	vision	of	a	second	world	of	
Forms	along	the	lines	of	the	prevalent	interpretation	of	Plato’s	Allegory	of	the	Cave,	for	
Gadamer	theoria	is	an	experience	of	heightened	and	creative	emergence	of	the	
becoming	of	being	that	occurs	within	language	in	the	here	and	now,	and	which	may	
serve	as	a	measure	of	sorts.	I	believe	that	the	truth-value	of	this	for	Gadamer	would	rest	
on	the	engagement	of	the	subject	matter	through	our	linguistic	experience	of	the	world	
as	experienced	through	conversation,	aesthetic	perspectives	such	as	the	symbol	and	the	
festival,	experiences	of	art,	and	theoria.	For	Gadamer,	as	with	his	hermeneutics	more	
generally,	the	activity	of	theoria	is	something	that	will	never	be	complete	and	is	always	
ongoing,	but	nevertheless	seems	to	reorient	us	towards	a	holism	that	impacts	our	lives	
and	potentially	encourages	a	more	ethical	relation	to	others.	To	draw	on	another	
conception	from	Gadamer’s	discussions	of	the	festival,	we	move	past	our	
purposefulness	and	have	a	different	sense	of	time,	there	is	a	tarrying,	and	he	writes,	
“The	essence	of	our	temporal	experience	of	art	is	in	learning	how	to	tarry	in	this	way.	
And	perhaps	it	is	the	only	way	that	is	granted	to	us	finite	beings	to	relate	to	what	we	call	
eternity”.52	This	tarrying	is	akin	to	the	lived	experience	of	theoria,	an	abandonment	to	
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the	real	and	participation	like	in	a	festival,	an	experience	that	is	related	to	the	divine	
and	the	whole	for	a	time.	Like	Plato’s	understanding	of	a	theoros,	for	Gadamer	
theoretical	insight	is	not	something	that	is	unrelated	to	normal	reality,	but	rather	is	
something	to	be	applied	back	into	the	everyday.	As	Gadamer	writes	in	respect	to	the	
relational	experience	that	a	work	of	art	may	have	on	us,	this	is	“a	shattering	and	a	
demolition	of	the	familiar.	It	is	not	only	the	‘This	art	thou!’	disclosed	in	a	joyous	and	
frightening	shock;	it	also	says	to	us;	‘Thou	must	alter	thy	life!’”.53						
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